Weapons for Victory by Robert James Maddox

Author:Robert James Maddox [Maddox, Robert James]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780826274335
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: University of Missouri Press
Published: 2004-08-23T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER 7

Japan Unbowed

An Office of War Information transmitter began broadcasting the text of the Potsdam Declaration by short-wave radio within three hours of its release on July 26. It was aired frequently thereafter, leading a British official to warn that such repetition would give the impression that the Allies were “anxious” for peace and would offer better terms if the Japanese held out longer. He cited as evidence a Japanese broadcast contrasting the “softening attitude of the Allies” with the “stiffening attitude of Japan.”1

Japanese officials began discussing the declaration on the morning of July 27, even before the translation was completed, and several meetings at the highest levels were held during the day. Foreign Minister Togo and Premier Suzuki advocated a policy of delay. They wished to send a noncommittal reply, or none at all, to buy time to seek favorable clarifications of terms, particularly with regard to the emperor, and to pursue Soviet mediation. Army and navy hard-liners vehemently disagreed. They found a number of the conditions totally unacceptable and insisted that anything less than an immediate, defiant rejection would sorely damage military and civilian morale.

A compromise was reached. The premier managed to get reluctant approval to refrain from answering the declaration pending the outcome of overtures to the Soviets. Because the fact that the Allies had issued an ultimatum could not be kept secret, Suzuki proposed to issue an expurgated version of it as a news item merely reporting enemy propaganda. Those parts would be excised that might appeal to peace sentiment in Japan, such as assurances that the Allies did not intend to enslave the people or destroy the nation and that military personnel would be free to return home after being disarmed.

In making his case for withholding comment, Suzuki used the Japanese word mokusatsu, which literally means to “kill it with silence,” but which has harsher connotations such as to “treat it with silent contempt.” Someone leaked the premier’s phrase to the press, with the result that on Saturday morning several newspapers used it to describe the government’s official position toward the declaration. Nor was that all. The militarists, reneging on the fragile understanding reached the day before, pressured Suzuki into appearing at a press conference that afternoon to denounce the ultimatum: “I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of this war.” Japanese radio broadcasts and newspaper items thereupon began referring to the declaration as “insolent,” “unforgivable,” and “ridiculous.”2

Truman has been criticized for not seizing upon the ambiguity of mokusatsu to inform the Japanese through diplomatic channels that they might retain the emperor. Had he done so, some have claimed, the war might have ended without further bloodshed.3 But even if there had been any doubts over the Japanese reply—there were none—Suzuki’s press conference and the subsequent media coverage would have dispelled them.

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